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with added force. In bankruptcy cases involving large corporations, the court
must appoint an independent trustee charged with the preparation of the plan.
Furthermore, the plan and activities of committee members are directly under
the court's control. Under these circumstances the danger from speculative
purchases by insiders would seem much less serious than in cases of extra-judi-
cial liquidation or reorganization. In reorganizations involving debt securities,
moreover, security-holders of various classes are typically represented in the
negotiations concerning the plan by separate committees or agents. In a stock
readjustment, however, the plan is often prepared by corporate officers and di-
rectors who are interested in the junior shares. Where the plan is neither the
product of adversary negotiations nor subject to direct judicial control, there
would seem special need to protect the directors from the temptations of the
market.
IDISSOLUTION OF A SUBSIDIARY CORPORATION
A TRAP FOR THE UNWARY PARENT*
A prolific source of litigation has been the existence of a minority stock inter-
est in a subsidiary managed by officers of its parent corporation. Dissolution of
the subsidiary is often resorted to as a means of terminating the troublesome
situation., The difficulties inherent in the dissolution device, however, are
strikingly illustrated in recent litigation involving the Inland Steel Company
and its ore-carrying subsidiary incorporated in West Virginia.2 In each of its two
opinions, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enunciated two
propositions: i) that, under the West Virginia statute providing for dissolu-
tion upon the vote of holders of sixty per cent of the shares of capital stock, a
prosperous corporation may be dissolved regardless of motive and expediency;
and 2) that, in the event of such a dissolution, if the majority stock holder pur-
chase the corporate assets, the minority have a cause of action unless the ma-
jority pays the fair value of the assets, including the going concern value of the
business. The situation to which these principles were applied was analyzed by
the court, as one in which the majority stockholder brought about the dissolu-
tion of the corporation and the sale of its assets in order to get rid of the minor-
ity. Although the price paid was conceded to have been a fair price for the
physical assets, nothing had been added for intangibles, and the majority stock-
holder was held to have improperly appropriated the going concern value of a
prosperous business.
At common law most courts have held that neither the dissolution nor the
sale of the entire assets of a prosperous corporation can be accomplished without
*Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F. (2d) 369 (C.C.A. 7th 1941), cert. den. 62 S. Ct. 1045
(1942).
' Hornstein, Voluntary Dissolution-A New Development in Intracorporate Abuse, 51
Yale L. J. 64 (I94z).
2 Lebold v. Inland S. S. Co., 82 F. (2d) 351 (C.C.A. 7th 1936); Lebold v. Inland Steel Co.,
125 F. (2d) 369 (C.C.A. 7th 1941), cert. den. 62 S. Ct. 1045 (1942).
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the unanimous consent of the stockholders.3 The argument underlying this
rule is that the corporate charter is a contract between the stockholders for
specified purposes, and that dissolution or sale would be a negation of these
purposes and a breach of the contract.4 On the other hand, those courts which
have permitted the dissolution of a prosperous corporation by a majority vote of
the stockholders have argued that the continuation of the corporate enterprise is
a matter of business judgment similar to other questions of corporate policy en-
trusted to the majority stockholderss This argument apparently prevailed with
most of the legislatures, for statutes have become almost universal permitting
corporations to dissolve, or to sell their entire assets, upon the approval of a
specified percentage of the stockholders.'
Under such statutes, dissolution has often served as a convenient device to
eliminate minority interests.7 Corporate combinations have frequently in-
volved as a first step the making of a purchase or exchange offer to all the stock-
holders of the corporation to be absorbed. After a large majority of the shares
has thus been acquired, the dissolution technique has been used to bring about
the acquisition of the assets and the retirement of the minority shares s .8In the
face of such a statute, most courts have refused to interfere with either the dis-
solution proceedings or with the sale of the entire corporate assets, unless "ac-
tual fraud" on the part of the management is shown.9
'Although the rule that the majority stockholders stand in a .fiduciary rela-
3 American Seating Co. v. Bullard, 29 o Fed. 896 (C.C.A. 6th 1923); People v. Ballard, 134
N.Y. 269, 32 N.E. 54 (1892); Kean v. Johnson, 9 N.J. Eq. 401 (1853); see Geddes v. Anaconda
Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); see also Fain, Limitations of the Statutory Power of Majority
Stockholders to Dissolve a Corporation, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 677, 678 (1912).
4 Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 596 (X921).
S Beidenhopf v. Des Moines Life Ins. Co., i6o Iowa 629, 142 N.W. 434 (i913); Bowditch v.
Jackson Co., 76 N.H. 351, 82 AtI. 1014 (1912); S.E.C., Report on the Study and Investigation
of the Work, Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Com-
mittees, pt. 7, at 559 (1938).
6 Such statutes have been passed in every state but one. Hornstein, op. cit. supra note x,
at 65.
7 Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, Report of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, pt. 3, at 1429 (1940).
8 The advantage of this technique is that the bulk of the assets of the subsidiary can be
absorbed by the parent without affording the minority stockholders of either corporation an
opportunity for the appraisal of their shares, as would usually result in either a technical merg-
er or consolidation. Ibid.
9 Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. i, 12o Ati. 486 (1923);
Wall v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 216 Fed. 242 (D.C. Mont. i914); Windmullerv. Standard
Distilling & Distributing Co., 114 Fed. 491 (C.C.N.J. 1902). See Allaun v. Consolidated Oil
Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 325, 147 Ati. 257, 261 (1929), where the court in discussing the related
problem of the sale of the entire assets of a corporation said that the majority stockholders
were to be given the presumption of good faith and fairness, and only if the disparity between
the sales price and the value of the assets was great enough to indicate that it arose from im-
proper motives or reckless indifference on the part of the majority stockholders, rather than
from an honest mistake in business judgment, would a proposed sale be upset.
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tionship to the minority is often enunciated in the cases, it seldom has been ap-
plied to the action of the majority in bringing about dissolution."° It is only
under statutes such as that of New York, which requires that the dissolution
be "advisable," that the courts have required majority stockholders to consider
the "corporate good" above their own personal interests in deciding whether the
corporation should be dissolved." The statutes in most states, West Virginia
among them, apparently give the specified percentage of the stockholders the
absolute right to dissolve the corporation without regard to the interests of
the minority." Similar statutes providing for the sale of the entire assets of
a corporation by a majority vote have been interpreted in the same way. 3
In the Allied Chemical case 4 the Delaware court said, "the bald question of
whether the entire assets should be sold is to be determined by the stockholders
entirely aside from the question of whether it would be to the best interests of
the corporation to sell them."
The same court distinguished, however, between the power of the majority
stockholders to sell the assets, and the power to fix the terms and conditions of
the sale.'s It is well established that the majority stockholders, in selling the
corporate assets to themselves, do not by that action alone violate any fiduciary
duty to the minority. 6 That they do violate such an obligation, if they sell the
assets to themselves at an unfair price, is also well established.17
2o In those cases in which a dissolution was set aside or damages awarded for breach of
fiduciary duty, the breach has almost always been in the sale of the corporate assets at an
unfair price. Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (igg); Nave-McCord Mercantile
Co. v. Ranney, 29 F. (2d) 383 (C.C.A. 8th 1928); Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 221
Fed. 529 (C.C.A. 6th i95); Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co., I44 Fed. 765 (C.C.A. 8th
I9O6); Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 27 Fed. 625 (C.C.N.Y. i886); see S.E.C., Report on
the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective
and Reorganization Committees, pt. 7, at 584 (1938).
"1 Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. I85, 123 N.E. 148 (igig). For inter-
pretations of similar statutes see Paine v. Saulsbury, 200 Mich. 58, 166 N.W. io36 (ig8);
White v. Kincaid, 149 N.C. 415, 63 S.E. io9 (i9Og).
12 Hornstein, op. cit. supra note i, at 66.
3 Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 147 Atl. 257 (1929); Nave-McCord
Mercantile Co. v. Ranney, 29 F. (2d) 383 (C.C.A. 8th 1928); Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v.
Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. I, 12o AtI. 486 (1923). One court in speaking of the power to
sell the corporate assets under such a statute said that "motive, vendee, price, consideration
are all immaterial, provided the transaction be free from fraud." Wall v. Anaconda Copper
Mining Co., 216 Fed. 242, 244 (D.C. Mont. x914).
'4 14 Del. Ch. I, II, 120 Atl. 486, 490 (1923).
IS Ibid., at 11-12, 491. This distinction is severely criticized in 2 Bonbright, Valuation of
Property 814-I5 (937) where it is pointed out that the power to sell the corporate assets can
only be tested in terms of the price and conditions fixed by the majority, and cannot be sepa-
rated from the power to determine the conditions of the sale.
6 See cases cited in note 9 supra.
'1 Note io supra. In S.E.C., Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities,
Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees, pt. 7, at 586 (1938),
doubt is indicated that the Delaware courts would pursue the distinction between the power to
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It was this principle which the court considered applicable under its interpre-
tation of the facts in the Inland case. Although the price paid for the physical
assets was admittedly fair, yet, according to the court, that price did not include
the value of good will belonging to the subsidiary. Thus the minority stock-
holders were held to be entitled to their share of the going concern value of the
business. Since the court held, however, that the power of the majority stock-
holder to dissolve the corporation would not be restricted, it might be argued
that it had the power to deprive minority stockholders of their share of the good
will, since by dissolution the good will is necessarily extinguished. To this the
court answered that while the majority stockholder might if it chose extinguish
the good will, it did not have the right to appropriate it. This answer seems
sound both on principle and as a matter of policy. The complex structure of
our legal and economic systems may require that majorities, in determining
whether an enterprise is to be liquidated or reorganized, be allowed to pursue
their "enlightened self interest." On the other hand, justice requires that ninor-.
ity interests be protected from schemes of majority stockholders to enrich them-
selves at the minority's expense.
Unfortunately, the court in the Inland cases failed properly to interpret the
facts to which these principles were applied. The court failed to see that, in the
light of the peculiar history of this parent-subsidiary relationship, no appropria-
tion of good will was apparently involved. The history is worth sketching in
some detail.
Inland Steel Company had been founded in 1893. In 1gii, N. F. Leopold,
father of the plaintiffs and brother-in-law of P. D. Block, president of Inland
Steel, proposed the organization of a steamship company, with the steel com-
pany as majority stockholder, for the purpose of hauling the steel company's
raw materials from their various locations on the Great Lakes to Inland's
hearths at Indiana Harbor. The Inland Steamship Company was accordingly
incorporated under the laws of West Virginia. Sixteen hundred shares of capital
stock were issued, of the par value of $ioo each. Until 1935, 672 per cent of
these shares were owned by the steel company, i8 per cent by Mr. Leopold, and
the remainder by employees or business associates of the steel company. Since
1ii, P. D. Block had been the president of the steamship company as well as
of the steel company, and a majority of the board of directors of the steamship
company had always been composed of directors and employees of the steel
company.
sell and the terms of the sale to the conclusion just reached. The doubt is based on a dictum
in Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., io Del. Ch. 318, x47 Atl. 257 (1929), that if the sole purpose
of the sale is to freeze out the minority stockholders, it may be enjoined. This dictum is dis-
cordant with the whole tone of the case, whose holding was, that a sale by the majority stock-
holders for the purpose of forcing the corporation to pay debts it owed them is not to be en-
joined for that reason alone. In the event that a case should arise in which the price paid for
the assets was fair, even though the minority were frozen out, the Delaware court would prob-
ably not set aside the sale.
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The operations of the steamship company were remarkably successful. The
figures for the years 1925 to 1934 indicate that the average annual earnings dur-
ing that period were $134 per share and the average annual dividends $io3 per
share. As already stated, the shares were of $ioo par value and presumably rep-
resented an investment of no larger amount. The sole basis for these huge earn-
ings was the tonnage transported for the steel company which was the sole cus-
tomer of its subsidiary. The court found that there never had been a contract
concerning rates or requiring the steel company to give its traffic to the steam-
ship company. The rates paid by the steel company are referred to as "going
rates" and in the first opinion the court spoke of them as "prevailing market
rates." As the source of the steamship company's large earnings and thus of the
alleged good will, these rates are of greatest importance. It can hardly be true
that they represented competitive or "going" rates which a steel company like
Inland would have to pay if it contracted for the bulk of its tonnage with an in-
dependent fleet owner. The rates paid may, of course, represent a market rate
for the company's excess tonnage in periods of peak demand. 8
At the annual meeting of the steamship company in December, 1934, Mr.
Block stated that the steel company desired to purchase the minority interests.
A committee was thereupon appointed.to fix the value of the ships. Its report
was submitted the following May, stating that inasmuch as the steel company
had indicated its unwillingness to continue placing its business with the steam-
ship company on the terms theretofore in effect, it recommended the purchase
of the minority stock at a price of $700 per share. It did not report on the value
of the ships, but the price fixed for the shares reflected a valuation of corporate
assets at $i,o3o,ooo.19 The price was fixed by the vice-president of both the
steel and steamship companies, who candidly stated that if the minority stock-
holders did not sell at $700 per share, the steel company, as majority stock-
holder, would dissolve the steamship company, sell its ships, and distribute the
proceeds. He further stated that in order to protect its investment the steel
company would bid enough at the sale to realize $700 per share, but that if a
better bid should be made it would be accepted.
The plaintiffs objected to selling at that price, calling attention to the fact
that on the basis of capitalized earnings their stock was worth close to $2oo0 per
share. The steel company refused to submit the value of the shares to arbitra-
tion, and gave notice of a special meeting of the stockholders to consider dis-
solution. Thereupon, the plaintiffs filed suit to restrain the proposed dissolu-
tion. The district court held that the dissolution should not be enjoined; that in
fixing the value of the stock the past record of earnings should not be consid-
ered; that the offer was fair, and that if it should be assumed that the steel corn-
i8 The rate at which the subsidiary was paid for transporting the bulk of the steel com-
pany's tonnage was the same as the rate at which the excess tonnage was transported by the
independent Premier Steamship Company.
19 This figure is probably an error in the record since it represents somewhat less than $7oo
per share and is less than the $r,l 20,000 actually paid for the ships; see note 22 infra.
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pany intended to terminate its traffic arrangement with its subsidiary, it would
be for the best interests of the stockholders to dissolve the company.
On appeal, the circuit court held that the plaintiffs' action was premature,
invoking the first of the principles discussed above, that under the controlling
statute dissolution might be voted regardless of motive or expediency."° It also
asserted, however, that in the disposition of the corporate assets the majority
stockholders owe a fiduciary duty to the minority and may derive no benefit at
their expense, and that, in the determination of the value of the minority inter-
est, among the things to be considered are "cost of physical assets .... market
price, earnings, the chances of future successful operation, and the prospects of
continued earnings.""12 Specifically, the district judge was said to have erred in
approving the $700 valuation because he ruled that the earnings record could
notl bel considered. Thus the decision of the circuit court of appeals was, at the
same time, an affirmation of the holding of the district court and a denial- of
most of its findings and inferences.
In the meantime, the affairs of the steamship company had proceeded with
the usual success, a dividend of $i5o per share having been declared for 1935.
Eight days after the decision of the court, notice was given of a stockholders'
meeting to consider the matter of dissolution. At the meeting a resolution was
adopted calling for the dissolution of the steamship company and the sale of its
assets. At the public sale that followed, the ships were purchased by the steel
company for $i,i2o,ooo, a price that admittedly represented their fair value.
In the ensuing distribution, the stockholders received a total of $604.17 per
share." The ships were immediately put into service by the steel company per-
forming exactly the same function as heretofore.
The minority stockholders again brought suit in the district court, this time
for damages for alleged fraudulent acts of the steel company in so utilizing its
position as to force the steamship company out of a prosperous going business
and appropriate its business at the expense of the minority stockholders. The
district court again dismissed the action. The decision of the appellate court has
already been stated. Emphasizing that the apparent purpose of the dissolution
was to eliminate the minority stockholders, it reversed the district court and
held that, although the steel company was within its statutory rights in forcing
a dissolution, "no legislative enactment could endow them [the steel com-
pany officers] with the right as trustees for the minority stockholders to take
over for their own .... all assets and all business of the company for which they
were fiduciaries, if to do so was clearly and obviously against the best interests
of the company and the minority stockholders.'3 The court further said that,
"the so-called dissolution was a mere device by means of which defendant ap-
" Lebold v. Inland S. S. Co., 82 F. (2d) 351, 353 (C.C.A. 7th 1936). 21 Ibid., at 356.
The purchase price, $II2o,ooo, is equal to the cost of iooo shares at $700 per share. The
actual price per share received, $604.I7, was lower because of deductions for taxes and the
expenses of the public sale.
23 Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F. (2d) 369, 372 (C.C.A. 7th 1941), cert. den. 62 S.'Ct.
1045 (1942).
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propriated for itself the transportation business of the Steamship Company to
the detriment of plaintiffs. '24 The measure of damages was held to be the differ-
ence between what the plaintiffs had received and "what the stock was really
worth as stock in a going prosperous concern continuing in business." 2
The court noted that evidence of both parties indicated that "if the Steam-
ship Company had been considered a going concern and if its business might
reasonably be expected to continue, the value of plaintiffs' stock would be in the
neighborhood of $2000 per share." 26 The whole question, of course, is whether
the business might reasonably be expected to continue. To begin with, nowhere
does the court say that inland, once having placed traffic with the subsidiary, is
bound to do so indefinitely. If it is not bound, the parent would not seem to
have appropriated any good will or going concern value whatever. Further-
more, it should be apparent that the huge earnings of the steamship company
could not possibly continue even if there had been no dissolution. Annual earn-
ings of i5o per cent of the original capital investment, made over a period of
25 years, and all made from business furnished by a single customer, suggest that
the customer has been overpaying for the service it is getting. At the trial the
minority stockholders admitted that the so-called "going rates" were too high
and that lower rates could be obtained by the steel company. However we re-
gard the action of the steel company in having enormously enriched its subsidi-
ary, it would certainly not have been a breach of fiduciary duty to cease pouring
"a golden stream to the minority stockholders. ' '27
The steel company could certainly have renegotiated rates, and without un-
fairness to the subsidiary could have reduced its returns to a very moderate
rate. If, after continuing at the new rate for a number of years, the majority
stockholders should then have voted dissolution, even if the capitalized earn-
ings were taken as the measure of value, it would have supported a valuation of
little, if anything, more than the value of the physical assets. If dissolution
could be accomplished under these circumstances with payment to the minor-
ity of only its pro rata share of the proceeds of the physical assets, it would seem
that there is no basis for the court's insistence that in the principal case the
minority have been deprived of any intangible values.
To be sure, in some cases it may appear unfair that dissolution should be used
to expel minority stockholders who have shared the risk during the early years
of the corporation.28 The objection has force even though the minority is paid
for its share of all intangible values; for the minority may prefer to remain in
the enterprise. It is rather surprising that there is not more authority support-
ing the view that even under statutes of the West Virginia type, dissolution re-
fers to complete liquidation or to sale to an outsider, and that the dissolution
24 Ibid., at 373.
2S Ibid., at 375.
36 Ibid. (italics added).
27 Lebold v. Inland S. S. Co., 82 F. (2d) 352, 353 (1936).
2a Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 Pac. 1004 (19o4).
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section may not be used to accomplish what is in effect a merger.29 If the merger
device had been used here, and if the dissenters had elected to take the appraised
value of their shares, a question of valuation would be raised, of course, similar
to the question involved in the principal case. 30
The case has been remanded to the district court for the determination of
damages in accordance with the opinion of the appellate court. This will be
found to be no easy task. It is not impossible that the difficulties may lead the
district court to find that the value of the minority's stock in this "going pros-
perous concern" is actually no more than their proportionate share of the value
of the physical assets. In that event, if the district court should make findings
adequately analyzing the source of the steamship company's earnings, it should
not be impossible to induce the appellate court to sustain the decision.
PROIIBITIONS AGAINST MULTIPLE STATE
INHERITANCE TAXATION OF IN-
TANGIBLES REMOVED*
The State Tax Commission of Utah taxed' shares of stock of a Utah corpora-
tion that were transferred at the death of a New York domiciliary., In a proceed-
ing before the trial court the administrators contention that the inheritance tax
was invalid under the holding of First National Bank of Boston v. Maine' was
sustained. The Supreme Court of Utah upheld the trial court, 3 specifying that
2? The holding of the Inland decision might be construed to support this distinction since
there is language in the case that implies that the so-called dissolution was a weak device by
means of which the majority stockholder appropriated the transportation business of its sub-
sidiary. If this is the true construction to be put on the opinion, however, it is difficult to recon-
cile it with the previous decision in which the steel company was permitted to proceed with its
plans to dissolve the subsidiary and purchase its assets; cf. Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co.,
i6 Del. Ch. 318, 147 At. 257 (1929); In re Doe Run Lead Co., 283 Mo. 646, 223 S.W. 6oo
(I92o); Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 Pac. 1004 ( 9o4).
30 See Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders under Appraisal Statutes, 45 Harv. L.
Rev. 233 (ig3i); Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 Corn.
L. Q. 420 (1930).
* State Tax Com'n of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
x Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933) §§ 80-12-2, 8o-12-3.
2 284 U.S. 312 (1932). The Court held invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment the at-
tempt by Maine, the state of incorporation as well as the situs of the corporate property, to tax
the transfer-by-death of shares of stock owned by a Massachusetts domiciliary. Massachusetts
had taxed the transfer as the state of domicile of the shareholder. This ruling was the culmina-
tion of the outlawing of double taxation of intangibles which was begun in 1930 in Farmers
Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (I93o), and continued in Baldwin v. Missouri,
281 U.S. 586 (1930), and Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Com'n, 282 U.S. 1 (193o).
3 x16 P. (2d) 923 (Utah, 194).
